18 April 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Acting Presidential Briefing Coordinator

SUBJECT : Theater Nuclear Forces (U)

25X1A

1. The meeting with the NIOs will be at 10:00 A.M., Thursday, 19 April 1979. [redacted] Acting NIO/CF, will act as moderator. (U)

2. Since you may not have had a chance to review this excerpt from Foreign Policy which discusses some of the issues involved, I am retransmitting it. (U)

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[redacted]

Attachment

GERMAN-AMERICAN MILITARY FISSURES

by Alex A. Vardamis

The future of West Germany is the key to the future of Europe. The bedrock of American policy toward Western Europe should therefore be the maintenance of close ties with Bonn, as a partner and not as a competitor. However, fundamental differences over a number of complex political, economic, and military issues have caused the U.S.-West German relationship to seem more competitive than cooperative. As a result, West Germany has begun to seek greater freedom of action in the Atlantic Alliance and a larger leadership role in a more assertive European Community.

Such changes will ultimately benefit the other nations of Western Europe and the United States politically and militarily. A more tightly unified European Community led by West Germany would possess the requisite scientific, industrial, and military resources to create a local counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact. Although it would diminish American political and economic influence in the area, a militarily strong community would ensure the maintenance of the strategic balance in Europe without the need for endless infusions of U.S. manpower and equipment. It would also represent a major step toward resolving some of the problems that have plagued Washington's relations with the capitals of Western Europe by bringing about a healthier Atlantic community that is not dominated by the United States.

The first priority is an improvement in the relationship between the United States and

ALEX A. VARDAMIS *is a colonel in the U.S. Army. This article, the result of his research as a fellow at the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs, is being published simultaneously in German in* Europa-Archiv. *The views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily of any U.S. government department or agency.*

the European Community's strongest member, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). To West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, recent U.S. policy has been dangerously unpredictable. President Carter's human rights stance and its deleterious effect on détente, his indecisive handling of American economic problems, and the clash between Washington and Bonn over nuclear energy issues have convinced West Germans that U.S. policy is at best hastily conceived and at worst lacking in overall purpose, confused, and reactive.

This confusion and mistrust has also characterized the military relationship between the two countries. The West German government regards the Carter administration as committed to mutually advantageous arms reductions with the Soviet Union but as unable to translate that position into an improvement of either East-West relations or of the military balance in Europe. Bonn anxiously watches what appears to be an alarming Soviet military build-up in Eastern Europe, but it also scrutinizes the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) apprehensively because it fears that American negotiations will fail to safeguard the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In a major address before the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London in October 1977, Schmidt asserted that "strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union would be bound to impair the security of West European members of the alliance vis-à-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations." West German leaders are particularly concerned that the United States might acquiesce to Soviet demands to restrict the range of American land-based cruise missiles and their transfer to NATO allies. Moscow would accept limitations on the modernization of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force in return, but would grant no

concessions in the European theater. From a West European viewpoint, such an agreement would lead to greater security for the United States, but would do nothing to reduce the threat to NATO Europe posed by the Soviet Union's new intermediate-range SS-20 missile and by its new supersonic bomber, the Backfire.

These fears have been reinforced by SALT opponents in the United States. In an address before the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in Lisbon last November, Senator Henry Jackson (D.-Washington) said of the SALT II treaty, then in the last stages of negotiation:

> It would be a curious agreement indeed that permitted unlimited numbers of Soviet MIRVed [equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] 4000 kilometer ballistic missiles while prohibiting the deployment of a single NATO ground-launched cruise missile with a conventional warhead and a range of 601 kilometers. The SS-20 can strike any target in European NATO; NATO cruise missiles based at NATO's most forward positions will be unable to reach some Soviet forces in eastern Poland. Thus much of the Warsaw Pact and all of the Soviet Union will become a sanctuary, protected against the most promising military technology available to the United States and its allies.

A Matter of Life and Death

SALT is not the only military-political issue that has troubled the West Germans. The possible deployment of enhanced radiation nuclear warheads, the so-called neutron bombs, in the FRG was an issue of major concern in 1978. The United States exerted pressure on Schmidt and his Social Democratic Party (SPD) to support deployment of the neutron bomb on German soil. Yet when Schmidt finally maneuvered into a position where he could accept the American stance under certain conditions, Jimmy Carter decided to defer production of the warhead indefinitely. Schmidt was thus left advocating a weapon he was initially reluctant to

support and that a considerable segment of his own party opposed.

Standardization of weaponry used by the various national armies in NATO is another military issue about which Bonn and Washington have significant disagreements. The Federal Republic believes that the United States has tried to use standardization as a façade to establish a one-way flow of American arms sales to Western Europe. The problem reached its peak when the joint US-FRG project to develop a main battle tank collapsed. From Bonn's point of view, this proved that the United States was unwilling to share production of even the components of a major weapons system. Frustrated by this failure and further disappointed by Washington's selection of the American XM-1 tank over the West German Leopard II, Bonn refused to buy the expensive American Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) until the United States agreed to purchase the Leopard's 120-millimeter gun for the XM-1.

These disagreements and others have convinced Bonn that it must gradually assert greater independence from the United States. The directions this new assertiveness will take in military terms, however, are far from clear. Will the trend toward independence require an increase in the strength of the FRG's armed forces? Will it in any significant way alter West Germany's traditional reliance on American theater nuclear weapons? And will Bonn demand a greater leadership role in NATO and in the nuclear chain of command? Will there be a change in the basic structure of NATO?

Once unthinkable, such changes now appear possible. West Germany has become the dominant country in Western Europe. As a result, the structure of responsibility within the NATO military alliance must be re-evaluated. This should begin with a re-examination of the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe.

The Federal Republic has consistently renounced ownership and control of nuclear

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weapons. In the London and Paris agreements of 1954, it pledged "not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons," and it later reiterated that commitment by signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in 1969. West Germany relies on the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella to deter any Warsaw Pact aggression. Understandably, even minor controversies concerning American nuclear weapons policy have a profound effect in Bonn.

One such controversy broke out in the summer of 1977 when sections of Presidential Review Memorandum Number 10, dealing with the U.S. option of a "flexible trip wire," were leaked to the American press. The document suggested that a mobile defense involving a temporary retreat from forward zones might be militarily prudent. As interpreted in the West German press, this meant that the United States was prepared to sacrifice one-third of Germany in the event of a Soviet attack.



Although Washington has assured Bonn that it has no intention of adopting such an option as U.S. policy, West German officials

remain suspicious of American intentions. Any plan that envisions surrendering West German territory to gain time to negotiate with the aggressor or to bring up reinforcements evokes cataclysmic visions in the Federal Republic. One West German journalist reacted sharply when Representative Les Aspin (D.-Wisconsin) attempted during a recent interview to explain why a border defense of Germany was foolish. The journalist asserted that "for many Americans that is casually regarded as an academic discussion. But for millions of Germans it is a question of life and death."

West German political leaders oppose any plan to abandon forward zones of the Federal Republic, for within a 100-kilometer-wide strip of land adjacent to its border are located the major cities of Hamburg, Hanover, Nuremberg, and Frankfurt; 30 per cent of the country's population; and 25 per cent of its industry. Thus, from the West German point of view, the principle of forward defense is unassailable.

"A Symbol of Mental Perversion"

Yet exactly how nuclear weapons can contribute to a border defense is far from clear. Since the early 1960s Washington has advocated the doctrine of "flexible response," which specifies that, should deterrence fail and war break out in Europe, nuclear weapons there will provide flexible options for NATO forces. Nuclear firepower could destroy enemy penetrations if conventional forces fail to contain an attack.

Bonn, on the other hand, is ambivalent toward the usefulness of American theater nuclear weapons currently deployed in Germany. The West German position is partially explained in its official White Paper on security published in 1976:

> The initial use of nuclear weapons is not intended so much to bring about a military decision as to achieve political effect. The intent is to persuade the attacker to reconsider his intention, to desist in his aggression, and to withdraw. At the same time, it will be impressed upon him that

> he risks still further escalation if he continues to attack.

West Germans view U.S. theater nuclear weapons primarily as a link to American strategic nuclear weapons, as an additional in-theater deterrent, and as a tangible symbol of the American defense commitment to West Germany. They are clearly not considered war-fighting weapons. Aside from the remote possibility of the early use of a single, small-yield nuclear weapon on or near the border to warn the Soviet Union that further aggression would risk the unleashing of U.S. strategic forces, the Federal Republic would not welcome a limited nuclear war on its territory. As Schmidt explained in his 1962 book, *Defense or Retaliation:*

> The use of tactical nuclear weapons . . . would . . . lead to the most extensive devastation of Europe and to the most extensive loss of life amongst its peoples. Europe is the battlefield for these weapons. . . . Those who think that Europe can be defended by the massed use of such weapons will not defend Europe, but destroy it.[1]

The Federal Republic accepted these risks as long as it was able to rationalize that the weapons would never be employed on German soil and that the United States was of similar mind. But that optimistic assumption has become increasingly tenuous. As Lothar Ruehl, writing in *Die Zeit* in August 1977, concluded:

> NATO is undermining its own self-assurance and the principal culprit has been the United States, now that Washington has been shown not to be invincible. For the first time in its existence, moreover, the U.S. itself is in a vulnerable position—being liable to nuclear attack—and Washington is reluctant to accept the risk, trying instead to delegate it to others or at least keep it as far away as possible from the USA.

When viewed from this perspective, Bonn's original reluctance to support de-

[1] *Helmut Schmidt*, Defense or Retaliation: A German View, *translated by Edward Thomas (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 100-101.*

ployment of the neutron warhead is understandable. U.S. advocacy of the neutron warhead rested on the assumption that, unlike current American theater weapons, which would cause so much collateral damage that they would probably never be used, neutron weapons could be employed with greater discrimination. Hence, they are more usable. Moreover, because the neutron warhead is designed for delivery systems with ranges of less than 100 miles, its use would be confined mainly to West and East German territory. Many West Germans feel that it is precisely the weapon's range limitation and the perceived likelihood of its use during an attack that would make any conventional conflict in Europe escalate quickly into a devastating localized nuclear war. Hence, the main West German argument against the neutron warhead is that it would permit the United States, with little risk to the American homeland, to consider West Germany as a potential arena for a nuclear confrontation with the Warsaw Pact.

It would be naive to conclude that the neutron bomb will never be deployed on German soil.

In the American press and in U.S. government circles, little notice was taken of the many influential West Germans speaking out against the neutron bomb. The most publicized opposition came from Egon Bahr, the controversial secretary general of the SPD, who denounced the weapon as "a symbol of mental perversion." Significant segments of the West German press and academia also denounced the weapon. Although some members of the FRG military were interested in the immediate tactical advantages of the neutron bomb as a defense against the Soviet tank threat, several highly respected retired Bundeswehr (armed forces) generals opposed the new warhead. In August 1977 retired air force General Johannes Steinhoff stated on German national television that "I am in

favor of retaining nuclear weapons as political tools but not permitting them to become battlefield weapons. . . . I am firmly opposed to their tactical use on our soil. I cannot favor a nuclear war on German territory while the two superpowers observe safely at a distance."

Carter's instincts more closely paralleled West German public opinion than did those of some of his advisers, who were convinced that the Federal Republic wanted and needed the new warhead. Thus, the president's decision to postpone production indefinitely while seeking concessions from the Soviet Union was generally consistent with Schmidt's earlier recommendations. More surprising is how quickly the original campaign to convince Bonn to support the weapon gathered momentum, despite the president's decision in the fall of 1977 to allow the West European members of NATO to choose unhindered whether or not to accept it.

Predictably, the persistent attempts to influence West Germany's decision backfired, and they are in part responsible for Bonn's current lack of confidence in American policy making. The Schmidt government suffered a loss of prestige among its own electorate as a result of Washington's mishandling of the issue. On the one hand, the SPD leadership was faced with an intense interparty split over the new warhead. On the other, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) conservative opposition accused the SPD of timidity in the face of Soviet denunciation of the neutron bomb. Finally, and perhaps most damaging, the chancellor was perceived as having little influence over an issue of vital importance to West German security.

Nevertheless, it would be naive to conclude that the neutron bomb will never be deployed on German soil. Should the Soviets fail to make reciprocal and verifiable concessions in the European theater, such as restrictions on deployment of the SS-20, Carter may be forced to order deployment of the

weapon. At best, the issue will lie dormant until the 1980 presidential election, when Carter's opponents are likely to include his decision to postpone production of the neutron bomb in their overall criticism of his neglect of U.S. military strength.

In Germany, where national elections will also be held in 1980, the opposition is likely to raise further doubts about the reliability of the American defense commitment to Western Europe. As Franz Josef Strauss, prime minister of the Bavarian state government and chairman of the CSU, remarked immediately after Carter's decision on the neutron warhead, "For the first time since World War II, an American president has openly knuckled under to a Russian czar."

Political and Military Anachronism

More generally, as a result of the debates over the neutron warhead, the Bonn government will surely re-examine the rationale behind all theater nuclear weapons and may seek to diminish its dependence on them. How important, for example, is linkage if the United States is in a position of strategic nuclear parity with the USSR? How important is the current inventory of nuclear weapons in West Germany as a visible token of the American commitment to the defense of Europe if the Bonn government believes that Washington is unreliable? The Federal Republic may well conclude that the existing theater nuclear force is a political and military anachronism of an era of American nuclear superiority and West German dependency.

Thus, the result of the neutron warhead controversy has been the acceleration of West Germany's search for new and more reliable alternatives to its traditional alliance with the United States. This trend has been apparent in the debate over the cruise missile, which could well increase the strain in the U.S.-West German relationship.

West Germans view the neutron bomb and the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) from very different perspectives. The neutron warhead is considered to be of min-

imal deterrent value, because its use would be confined primarily to West German territory. The GLCM, on the other hand, is seen as a credible deterrent to Soviet aggression because it could reach targets in Warsaw Pact territory. Bonn believes that the GLCM should at least be used as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The cruise missile is a small, pilotless, low-flying winged aircraft whose primary mission appears to be the destruction of battlefield targets, but whose potential range of 2,000 nautical miles or more makes it a threat to the Soviet homeland as well. West Germany is the only major military power in NATO that lacks such a deep-strike capability. Since the GLCM can be armed with either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, it would provide West Germany with a qualified, long-range deterrent against the Warsaw Pact.

The neutron warhead controversy has [accelerated] Germany's search for . . . alternatives to its traditional alliance with the United States.

The nuclear warheads would remain under U.S. custody and control. But even when armed with a conventional warhead, the GLCM offers unique military advantages. It would be more cost-effective than manned aircraft, for it would diminish the need for expensive pilot training and for keeping hundreds of fighter pilots and planes combat-ready; it would also decrease the number of large, vulnerable airfields needed to maintain fighter squadrons. Finally, a single cruise missile could hit a relatively small target, such as a bridge, with great accuracy. Thus, although the GLCM still requires further testing, it would offer a flexible, survivable, and highly mobile ground-launched delivery system for the European theater.

Washington has sought to convince Bonn that, unlike the neutron bomb, the GLCM

has only limited application for NATO. This position is based on the fact that the neutron bomb would not be able to reach the Soviet Union, while the cruise missile might provoke a Soviet strategic strike against the United States even if it is launched from West Germany. Washington's stance is interpreted in Bonn as another example of the apparent U.S. desire to confine any conflict to Europe.

The CDU/CSU coalition unequivocally supports acquisition by West Germany of a deep-strike capability against the Soviet Union. In the words of Manfred Woerner, CDU chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee, NATO should "exploit . . . cruise missiles," for "the Soviet Union cannot be allowed . . . to become a sanctuary in the nuclear phase of a conflict in Europe. The Soviet Union cannot be invited to contemplate a war limited exclusively to Western Europe, or even to German territory. Moscow must at all times be forced to reckon with the full ladder of escalation."

Schmidt and the majority of the SPD, on the other hand, are principally concerned that Washington keep its options open and that it not bargain away the new weapon without careful consultation with its NATO allies. The SPD position is not based on a desperate desire to obtain a deep-strike capability against the Soviet Union but on the belief that the cruise missile can be used to win concessions from Moscow in the European theater.

The proposed SALT II agreement includes a three-year protocol that bans the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea- or land-based launchers and that contains a vaguely worded provision limiting the transfer of American cruise missiles to Western Europe. Although the Federal Republic is not specifically mentioned, it is clearly the principal object of the restraints. After observing the SALT negotiations in Geneva, Representative Charles Wilson (D.-California), a ranking member of the House Armed

Services Committee, told the press that "the Soviets are honestly frightened of the West Germans. They fear the cruise missile might be deployed in Europe's NATO countries."

Bonn's main concern is that the United States has not exploited these Soviet anxieties to win concessions from Moscow on the deployment of its multiple warhead SS-20 nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe. Washington's overriding worry seems to be that the Soviet Union might convert the SS-20 into a three-stage intercontinental version, with a range of 5,500 miles, able to strike the continental United States. Despite American assurances, Bonn considers it unrealistic that the West can proceed with unrestricted deployment of the GLCM after the expiration date of the protocol, because it doubts that Washington can overcome the strong pressures against the weapon from Moscow and U.S. domestic sources.

Washington should consult closely with Bonn before making any final decision concerning the cruise missile, in order to avoid the mistakes that occurred during the neutron bomb debate. The differing U.S. and West German positions on the ground-launched cruise missile are only partially reconcilable. But it would be a serious mistake for American policy makers to remain inflexible on the issue or to suggest implicitly—through a failure to consider seriously the West German position—that decisions of global significance should be handled by the two superpowers alone. Such an approach would have a severely damaging effect on the U.S. relationship with Western Europe, because it would imply that Washington places a higher priority on maintaining a special, bilateral relationship with the USSR than on protecting West European interests.

How strenuously Bonn presses its point of view will depend partially on how it interprets the military balance in Europe. As Schmidt pointed out to the IISS in 1977: "SALT neutralizes the strategic nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. In Europe this magnifies the signifi-

cance of the disparities between East and West as regards tactical nuclear and conventional weapons." Bonn will certainly demand a greater voice in any future negotiations that affect those disparities.

Because the GLCM is both conventional and nuclear and both tactical and strategic, it confuses the usual distinctions between SALT and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. Thus, West Germany completely endorses the idea of connecting SALT and MBFR and of increasing the role of West European nations in all East-West arms control negotiations. For the United States to underestimate the crucial importance of this issue to West Germany or to deny Bonn a role in formulating a solution would be a crucial mistake.

If the Carter administration is unable to satisfy Bonn's requests for Soviet concessions in the European theater and for a larger role in arms control negotiations, the West Germans might conceivably opt for alternate sources of intermediate range missiles. It is improbable, however, that they would seek to produce their own cruise-type missiles. The current Bonn government is unlikely to jeopardize détente or its alliance with Western Europe and the United States in order to acquire an independent conventional, much less a nuclear, deep-strike capability against the Soviet Union.

What the Federal Republic might do is contribute to a joint European effort to build some sort of intermediate-range missile. The West Europeans have the capability to develop and produce a variant of the cruise missile, although without U.S. cooperation it would be less accurate than the American version. Nevertheless, a purely West European cruise missile would certainly be a threat to Soviet cities. The West Europeans might also decide to develop intermediate-range ballistic missiles, since the USSR possesses some air defense against the air-breathing GLCM but has no antiballistic missile (ABM) capability. Such a venture has already been suggested by France, which is experimenting

with its own cruise missile prototype. Surely Bonn had possible European nuclear cooperation in mind in 1969, when it signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty only after receiving written assurances from the Nixon administration that the treaty would not preclude West German participation in an independent European nuclear force.

A More Potent Bundeswehr

Such a change in Bonn's military policy would not necessarily be confined to nuclear weapons. West German defense expenditures are approximately equal to those of France, more than one and a half times those of Great Britain, four times those of Italy, five times those of the Netherlands, and six times those of Greece and Turkey combined. But despite its impressive contribution to NATO, West Germany could do more. Its defense expenditures represent less than 3 per cent of its gross national product (GNP), a figure surpassed by five other NATO members and considerably lower than the almost 6 per cent the United States spends.

The validity of measuring NATO defense contributions as a percentage of GNP is questioned by West German officials, who argue that such a yardstick penalizes their successful economy. Yet a modest increase of West Germany's defense outlays would help improve its independent conventional forward defense. Although the Federal Republic will probably resist spending more on its conventional forces, the United States should encourage it to do so in order to decrease its dependence on U.S. nuclear weapons.

The Bundeswehr's current strength of 500,000 soldiers was set as a goal in 1955, when its armed forces were first established, and it has remained unchanged despite the expanding Soviet threat in the intervening years. An increase in West Germany's conventional forces should be a high American priority, because the United States lacks the economic, political, and military capabilities to counter the Soviet force build-up in Europe alone. A dramatic increase in West Ger-

many's defense expenditures or in its manpower is unlikely. Such a course would not only require a reordering of Bonn's domestic priorities, but it would also disturb both the Soviet Union and some of the Federal Republic's NATO allies. Modest increases, though, should be politically acceptable.

Although the Soviet Union is uneasy about West Germany's military potential, Soviet fears of the current government in Bonn should not be exaggerated. The Federal Republic is a fundamentally different society from that which existed during World War II. The ratification of the Moscow-Bonn agreement of 1972 established a new basis for German-Russian cooperation and began a process of normalization of relations. Scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges between Moscow and Bonn have been increasing, particularly since Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's visit to West Germany in May 1978. West Germany has recently become the Soviet Union's most significant capitalist trading partner. In 1977 the Soviets and Germans exchanged over $5 billion worth of goods.

The Soviets and some NATO allies . . . prefer to see American rather than German troops in Western Europe.

Moreover, risking the ire of the Soviet Union by initiating an open debate over manpower increases for the Bundeswehr may be to Bonn's advantage. Such a threat may generate renewed Soviet interest in the MBFR talks, which Bonn would like to revitalize because they are an opportunity for West Germany to participate in disarmament negotiations. Under these circumstances, Moscow, whose main motivation for entering the MBFR negotiations was to obtain a treaty restriction on the future size of West Germany's armed forces, would probably also be eager to inject new life into the talks.

Referring to his attempt in recent months

to link SALT and MBFR, Schmidt stated that West Germany "must press ahead with the Vienna negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions in order to make an important step in the direction of a better balance of power in Europe." Perhaps the most effective way to stimulate the talks and to enhance West Germany's role in them is to rejuvenate their raison d'être.

The United States should encourage a modest increase in the size of the Bundeswehr. Militarily, a more potent Bundeswehr could be the key to improving the effectiveness of NATO. Economically, an increase in the size of the Bundeswehr would free the United States from the requirement of filling all perceived voids in NATO's conventional forces. In the past, Schmidt has looked to Washington to help reduce the visibility of Germany's military contribution to NATO. He has also frequently underscored the dire consequences of a withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe. During a visit to the United States in July 1976, Schmidt told the National Press Club that a military withdrawal would have a "catastrophic impact not only on Western Europe but on the equilibrium of power all over the globe." However, there is surely a difference between maintaining a strong U.S. commitment and increasing the American share of actual frontline defense because the Soviets and some NATO allies, fearing renewed German militarism, prefer to see American rather than German troops in Western Europe.

A more independent Federal Republic may also advocate a change in NATO military doctrine. NATO's present strategy, should deterrence fail, is to repel an attack as close to the border as possible and to regain lost territory rapidly. But any Warsaw Pact aggression against West Germany would be made incalculably more dangerous if NATO forces were prepared to counterattack across the border to move the Western defense line off West German soil.

But to be credible, the threat of offensive action must be backed up by offensive capa-

bility. The Germany army already has 82 tank battalions with 2,700 main battle tanks. In the early 1980s it will be deploying the new Leopard II, considered by many to be the most technologically advanced armored vehicle in the world and certainly the equal of the newest Soviet T72 tank. Its speed, range, mobility, and accuracy make the Leopard an ideal offensive weapon.

The rationale for the Bundeswehr's strong armored force, already about twice as large as its American counterpart on NATO's central front, is to defend against the Soviet Union's tank-heavy forces. But it is also capable of offensive action against the Warsaw Pact. The Federal Republic's most recent White Paper on defense asserts that "sustained combat operations in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany" must be precluded, for "such prolonged combat would end by destroying the substance of what was to be defended." An effective way to prevent such an eventuality would be to transfer rapidly any conflict to the aggressor's territory.

Related to these issues of doctrine are questions of military equipment and weapons standardization. West Germany is increasingly reluctant to purchase armaments from the United States and will in the future rely more upon domestic and European arms manufacturers to fill its needs. Beginning in 1961, the FRG was required to help pay costs of stationing U.S. troops in West Germany by purchasing large amounts of U.S. military equipment every year. In the summer of 1976, Schmidt and former President Gerald R. Ford officially terminated this requirement because of "the notably improved strength of the dollar and a more acceptable U.S. balance of payments position." Although both factors have since deteriorated, it is unlikely that any new agreement can be reached, given the current mood in Bonn. Because of the precipitous decline in the value of the dollar, the United States must firmly and imaginatively negotiate a resumption of some form of cost sharing. But the Federal Republic is

unlikely to agree to large purchases of American weapons systems.

Residue of Resentment

The handwriting is on the wall. There will be further cooperation among West European nations in the joint production of their own weapons and an increasing tendency to prevent American arms manufacturers from entering the European market. The process is already under way. Italy, Great Britain, and the FRG are jointly producing the supersonic, all-weather fighter-bomber *Tornado* to replace the American *Starfighter* in the West German air force. The *Alpha Jet* is one of several Franco-German cooperative arms ventures. Five NATO countries are collaborating with West Germany on the production of the Leopard II.

Even the significant edge that the United States possesses in nuclear delivery systems is being challenged. France has already suggested Eurogroup—an informal caucus of ten NATO members—help finance, develop, and produce French cruise missiles. This offer may be especially attractive to the FRG, which is prohibited from manufacturing "long-range missiles and guided missiles in its territory," by the 1954 London and Paris agreements on the future of West German military participation in NATO.

The U.S. government ought to cease exerting pressure on Bonn to purchase U.S. weapons systems. When Bonn capitulates to such pressure—as in the case of the AWACS—the residue of resentment and the divisive impact on the alliance frequently outweigh the benefits of the sale. The United States should instead encourage cooperative US-FRG ventures in weapons development. Such cooperation could help reduce U.S. defense expenditures. The United States might also consider purchasing a major weapons system from the Federal Republic to show that standardization is not merely a façade for increased American arms sales.

Finally, the Federal Republic is likely to

seek greater command authority within NATO. In the summer of 1977 Bonn officially requested that more senior appointments in NATO be reserved for West German officers. It pointed out that Great Britain, despite its sharply curtailed contribution to the alliance, received approximately 40 per cent of top command and staff positions, as did the United States, whereas little more than 10 per cent of the total was reserved for West Germans. NATO officials agreed that the distribution of high-level positions reflected the priorities of the late 1950s and was unfair to the FRG. As a result, more senior posts are being allotted to the Bundeswehr. The post of deputy to the supreme allied commander, previously reserved for a British officer, is now shared with a German general. The precedent for an expanded command role for the FRG has thus been established.

A reasonable assumption is that West German political and military leaders will continue to press for a greater role in the command and control of U.S. nuclear weapons on FRG soil. Moreover, although independent acquisition of nuclear weapons, even under the conservative leadership of the CDU/CSU, can be dismissed for the foreseeable future, FRG participation in an independent European nuclear force cannot be discounted.

The United States must recognize that the old, comfortable assumptions about the Federal Republic of Germany no longer apply today. Recent trends and events have clearly demonstrated that West Germany is no longer completely dependent on the United States and that it has become a world power in its own right. Hence, as an important first step toward revitalizing the NATO military alliance, the United States ought to redefine the foundations of its special relationship with West Germany. They should reflect the political, economic, and military realities of the late 1970s and not those of the 1950s. The United States must be imaginative enough to envision a NATO that it does not dominate but that is a community of mutually supportive nations.